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The combination of high unemployment rates and slow economic growth in
most European countries has lead to a re-examination of social security sys-
tems and triggered eﬀorts for possible alternatives of ﬁnancing these systems.
Empirical evidence by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and, more recently, by
Planas et al. (2007) suggests that a signiﬁcant part of European unemploy-
ment can be traced back to a steady rise in the costs of labour. Consequently,
there exists a direct link between wage-related social security contributions
and unemployment. Although unemployment rates have been declining in
recent years, the continuous rise in contribution rates resulting from popu-
lation aging implies that the problem is not only still relevant but will even
become more important in the future.
So far, several reform proposals to lower the wage tax have been discussed
in the literature. Yet, most existing studies focus on either environmental
tax reforms (e.g., Wendner (2001); Ono (2005, 2007)) or the introduction of
a consumption tax (e.g., Hu (1996); Lopez-Garcia (1996) and Lin and Tian
(2003)) as alternative ﬁnancing instruments. In contrast, capital income tax-
ation is generally not considered an alternative. This is due to the fact that
the literature dealing with optimal capital income taxation, originated by
Chamley (1986), generally ﬁnds it optimal not to tax income from capital.
Moreover, it seems to be apparent that a rise in capital income taxes that re-
duces the rate of return to savings hinders any growth process driven by capi-
tal accumulation. Yet, Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Caballé (1998) derive
potential positive growth eﬀects related to a rise in capital income taxation.
This is due to a shift of the tax burden from the young generation to the old,
giving rise to positive saving and growth eﬀects if the interest elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is suﬃciently small. Against this
background capital income taxation seems to provide a suitable alternative
to wage-related social security contributions.1 However, both models feature
full employment and discuss taxes levied to ﬁnance a ﬁxed public budget.
Hence, it is not clear a priori whether the derived growth eﬀects survive in
the presence of unemployment and tax-ﬁnanced social security systems.
The present paper examines possible positive growth eﬀects of an increase
of the capital income tax used to cut wage-related social security contri-
1Quite diﬀerently and in contrast with the empirical literature, Birk and Michaelis
(2006) develop a model in which the growth rate is independent of payroll taxes and
conclude that a reduction of the tax rate on capital ﬁnanced by higher payroll taxes
unambiguously promotes growth.
4butions and thereby increase employment. The issue is explored within an
overlapping generations model allowing for endogenous growth in the spirit
of Romer (1986). To capture important institutional features of European
economies, a tax-ﬁnanced social security system comprising unemployment
beneﬁts and pensions is introduced. Moreover, labour markets are imperfect
and characterized by wage bargaining between unions and ﬁrms generating
equilibrium unemployment.
The results of the present model reveal that an increase of capital income
taxation that lowers the wage tax not only reduces unemployment but can
additionally promote growth. Yet, whether growth is actually stimulated
depends on the magnitude of the diﬀerent, partly opposing eﬀects on capital
accumulation. Firstly, there is a direct eﬀect via the public budget inducing a
decline of the wage tax. This increases the net income of employed households
and thereby promotes savings as well as growth. Secondly, a higher tax on
capital income raises the present value of pensions, resulting in a disincentive
to accumulate capital and, thus, in lower growth. Thirdly, a rise in the
capital income tax provokes the opposing income and substitution eﬀects,
and, therefore, has an ambiguous impact on growth.
Consequently, depending on the magnitude of the diﬀerent eﬀects, a policy
reform that increases capital income taxation to lower the labour income
tax has the scope to not only reduce unemployment but moreover to facili-
tate growth. An extension allowing for imperfect mobility of capital reveals
that the theoretical results extend to the case of a small open economy. To
assess the relevance of possible growth-enhancing eﬀects, the model is cali-
brated to match data from the EU15. The results imply the existence of a
growth-maximizing capital income tax rate that is clearly positive. More-
over, the calibrated model indicates that increasing the capital income tax
fosters growth if the initial level of capital taxation is not excessively high.
Finally, the welfare eﬀects of the tax reform are discussed. This is important
as a reform that is not capable of generating a net welfare gain will most
probably lack political support. Extending the previous calibration exercise
and focusing on the range of tax rates where growth-enhancing eﬀects occur,
however, shows that the reform will indeed generate a net welfare gain already
in the ﬁrst period: while the old population clearly loses, the welfare gains
of the young are high enough to compensate for these arising losses.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the growth eﬀects of the revenue-neutral tax reform and discusses
the numerical results. The case of a small open economy and imperfect
5capital mobility is analyzed in the proceeding section. Section 4 then turns
to the welfare implication of the reform and studies whether the reform can
generate net welfare for the entire population. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a closed economy with overlapping generations in the tradition
of Diamond (1965). It is assumed that the population size grows at the
constant rate n = N/N−1 − 1. Labour markets are imperfect in the sense
that unemployment results from wage bargaining between unions and ﬁrms.
Moreover, a social security system ensures against the risk of unemployment
and the risk of old age via unemployment beneﬁts and pensions. The basic
model setup follows Bräuninger (2005) who studies interrelations between
unemployment, pensions and economic growth. We extend this work by
introducing capital taxation to explicitly analyze the impact of changes in
the taxation of capital income on the growth process.
2.1 Households
At each moment in time, the population consists of a large number N of
young individuals which either work or are unemployed and a large number
N−1 of old individuals which are retired from work. Each young individual
inelastically supplies one unit of labour. The fraction of working individu-
a l si sg i v e nb y( 1− u)N,w h e r eu denotes the unemployment rate. When
young, individuals work and receive income I, which comprises net wage in-
come if employed or unemployment beneﬁts if unemployed. This income is
partly used for consumption in the current period c1 and partly saved for
consumption during the retirement period c2. Consequently, the individual’s
ﬁrst period budget constraint is given by
I = c1 + s. (1)
When retired, an individual earns interest income on savings, Rs where R =
(1 + (1 − tr)r) denotes the interest factor and tr the tax on interest income
which constitutes an additional revenue instrument to ﬁnance social security.
Moreover, the individual receives a pension pw+1. The second period budget
can, thus, be described as
c2 =( 1+( 1− t
r)r)s + pw+1. (2)
6Individuals have identical preferences, depending on consumption during the
two periods of life, c1 and c2. These preferences are assumed to be described
















The parameter δ captures the individual’s discount rate and σ the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. Maximizing the above utility function subject
to the budget constraints yields the individual savings function























θ(R,σ)2 < 0( 6 )
Besides the straightforward dependence of individual savings on income I
and the pension ratio p, the interest factor R aﬀects individual savings via
two channels. Firstly, a decline in the interest factor, e.g. resulting from an
increase in the capital income tax, causes the income and substitution eﬀects.
Which of the two eﬀects dominates depends on the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. For σ>1, the substitution eﬀect dominates and savings
decline. For σ<1, the income eﬀect prevails and individual savings increase.
The eﬀect of a declining interest factor on savings is, therefore, ambiguous.
Secondly, a lower interest factor raises the present value of pensions. Since
pensions and savings are perfect substitutes, this pension eﬀect discourages
private capital accumulation and leads to crowding out of individual savings.
2.2 Government
Next, consider the role of the public sector in providing a social security
system that comprises both unemployment insurance and pensions. To do
so, the government can resort to two ﬁscal instruments, a wage tax tw and a
tax on capital income tr, which ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts as well as the
pay-as-you-go pension system. It is assumed that the contribution rates can
7be decided by the government, while the replacement rate and the pension
ratio are exogenously given. More precisely, granted unemployment as well
as retirement payments are ﬁxed in proportion to the gross wage with the
replacement rate b<1 and the pension ratio p<1. Consequently, a balanced
public budget requires
t
ww(1 − u)N + t
rrK = pwN−1 + bwuN, (7)
where pwN−1 constitute aggregate expenditures on pensions for the old gen-
eration and bwuN comprise unemployment beneﬁts paid to the fraction of
unemployed individuals uN. K denotes the current capital stock which is
fully determined by savings of the previous period. To focus on the role of
revenue-neutral changes of capital income taxation on growth, the budget
constraint is rearranged to express the wage tax tw as a function of the tax
on capital income tr,
t
w =
p + bu(1 + n)






Equation (8) reveals that an increase in the tax on capital income leads to a
reduction of the wage tax. Moreover, a higher rate of unemployment requires
more payments on unemployment beneﬁts and, thus, directly raises the wage
tax.
2.3 Production
On the production side of the model, perfect competition between a large
number of identical ﬁrms is assumed. Given the factor inputs capital K and
labour L, the production technology can be described by a Cobb-Douglas
production function of the form Y = AKα(EL)1−α with 0 <α<1. The pa-
rameter A is a general index of eﬃciency, while E describes a labour eﬃciency
index depending on the knowledge of workers.
This labour eﬃciency index allows to model an endogenous growth process
in line with Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988): Assuming that knowledge is ac-
cumulated in proportion to aggregate capital, the aggregate index of labour
eﬃciency equals E = K/L. This implies that there exists a positive external-
ity of the aggregate stock of capital on the production process. Moreover, as
will be explained in the following subsection, unemployment occurs in every
period with u denoting the proportion of unemployed individuals. It follows
that the aggregate labor input can be written as L =( 1−u)N. The produc-
tion technology thus simpliﬁes to the AK-type production function allowing
8for endogenous growth,
Y = AK. (9)
In line with Corneo and Marquardt (2000), labour eﬃciency in the present
setting is given by aggregate knowledge per employed worker. This captures
the idea of learning by doing as an increase in the physical capital stock
simultaneously enhances the aggregate stock of knowledge.
Firms maximize proﬁts Π = Y −wL−rK, implying that the wage rate and













Notice that output and the wage rate are proportional to capital and will
grow at the same rate in the steady state. In contrast, the interest rate is
constant. An increasing unemployment rate does neither aﬀect output nor
the interest rate, but increases the wage rate.
2.4 Labour Market
Despite of the fact that proﬁts will vanish in a competitive market equi-
librium, unions can try to capture quasi rents by pushing up their wage
demands: For a ﬁxed amount of capital employed by the ﬁrm, higher wage
demands induce ﬁrms to increase the marginal product of labour by lowering
the level of employment. This raises the wage rate employed workers receive
and is, thus, in the interest of the union.
Following Layard et al. (1991), the wage bargaining process occurs at the
ﬁrm level with every ﬁrm being represented by a union k.S i n c e a l l ﬁ r m s
and unions are identical, it suﬃces to consider the bargaining problem of a
representative union.2 This representative union is interested in maximizing
the aggregate utility of all union members N, which amounts to maximizing
the sum of expected income,
V = N ((1 − u)(1 − t
w)w + ua), (12)
where (1−tw)w denotes the net income when staying employed which might
occur with probability 1−u.T h ev a r i a b l ea describes the alternative income
2We will suppress the ﬁrm index in the following.
9that will be received in case the worker looses the job at this speciﬁc ﬁrm
with probability u. This alternative income can be described by the weighted
average a = φubw +( 1− φu)(1 − tw)w, indicating that in the presence of
periodical ﬂuctuations on the labour market, each employed worker faces a
positive probability 1 − φu of ﬁnding a job in another, identical ﬁrm. With
probability φu, the worker remains unemployed for the current period and re-
ceives unemployment beneﬁts. Moreover, the alternative income is also what
workers will receive in case the bargaining process fails, and thus constitutes
the threat point of the union, V = aN. In contrast, ﬁrms intend to maximize
proﬁts and face losses in form of the cost of capital Π=−rK if no solution is
reached in the bargaining process. Given this setup, the bargaining process




 γ  
Π − Π
 1−γ
= ((1 − t
w)wL− aL)
γ (Y − wL)
1−γ (13)
where γ denotes the bargaining power of the union. Solving the Nash-product
reveals that the net wage amounts to a ﬁxed mark up over alternative income,
(1 − t
w)w = µa = µ[φubw +( 1− φu)(1 − t
w)w] (14)
with µ ≡ 1+
αγ
(1−α). Rearranging equation (14) shows that the bargaining
process directly determines the rate of unemployment,
u =
(µ − 1)(1 − tw)
µφ(1 − tw − b)
. (15)
The unemployment rate resulting from the wage bargaining process depends
on the wage tax, while the wage tax arising from the governments budget
restriction depends on the rate of unemployment (equation (8)). In line with
Bräuninger (2005), solving the two equations veriﬁes the existence of either
two unemployment equilibria of which only one is stable, or no equilibrium
at all.3
These unemployment equilibria are displayed in Figure 1 as intersections of
the unemployment rate due to wage bargaining, u(tw), and the wage tax
derived using the public budget constraint, tw(u,tr). One can immediately
reveal that for a ﬁxed capital income tax tr
0, the stable unemployment equi-
librium can be found at the wage tax tw
1 . Yet, increasing the capital income
tax rate shifts the tw(u,tr) graph upwards, implying that a new stable equi-
librium realizes itself at a lower wage tax and a lower level of unemployment.
This gives rise to the following proposition:
3To see this, insert equation (8) into (15) to derive a quadratic expression determining
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Figure 1: Unemployment equilibria and the role of capital income taxation
Proposition 1. There exists an indirect, positive eﬀect of the capital in-
come tax on unemployment: Increasing tr decreases tw and thereby reduces
unemployment.
Proposition 1 indicates that raising the capital income tax is associated with
a lower wage tax and, thus, constitutes a potential policy option to increase
the level of employment. The intuition behind this result is the following:
A lower wage tax increases the individual’s net wage and thus the union’s
utility. Consequently, the union can mitigate its wage demands and still
attain the same utility level as before the tax reform. Lower wage demands
then reduce the level of unemployment. Y e t ,a tt h es a m et i m ea ni n c r e a s ei n
the taxation of capital income might reduce private savings incentives and
thereby deteriorate growth. To assess the overall eﬀect of such a policy, the
following section studies the eﬀects of changes in the capital income tax on
the growth factor of the economy.
3G r o w t h E ﬀ e c t s
To determine the growth factor of the domestic capital stock, one needs to
derive aggregate savings by summing up individual savings over all residents
N. Recall that at every moment in time a proportion (1−u) of the population
is employed earning (1 − tw)w, while a fraction u remains unemployed and
receives unemployment beneﬁts bw. Thus, aggregate savings can be stated
11as
S = ϑ(R,σ)[(1 − t
w)(1 − u)+bu]wN − θ(R,σ)pw+1N. (16)
In a closed economy setup, aggregate savings of the young are used to ﬁnance
next period’s capital stock K+1 = S. Therefore, aggregate savings can be
used to determine the growth factor of capital g = K+1/K. Expressing
the wage rate by the marginal productivity of labour, an implicit functional
relationship for the growth factor of capital can be derived,
g = ϑ(R,σ)




(1 − u)(1 + n)
. (17)
Solving for the growth factor explicitly yields
g =






  . (18)
Now consider the growth eﬀect of increasing the capital income tax,
dg
dtr =



















(1+n) > 0. An increase of the capital income
tax inﬂuences aggregate savings through three channels: Firstly, increasing
the capital income tax evokes the opposing substitution and income eﬀects.
Therefore, the overall eﬀect on savings and, hence, on growth is ambiguous,
∂ϑ
∂tr  0, and depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Sec-
ondly, a higher capital tax increases the present value of pensions
∂θ
∂tr > 0. As
a consequence, aggregate savings decline as the individuals save less for re-
tirement indicating that the pension eﬀect is detrimental to growth. Thirdly,






This increases the net wage of the employed part of the population, thereby
leading to more income out of which to save. Thus, this budget eﬀect is
equivalent to a pure positive income eﬀect and fosters the growth process.
The overall eﬀect of raising the capital income tax depends both on the mag-
nitude of the various eﬀects and on the direction of the savings eﬀect. This
gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Increasing the capital income tax while maintaining a bal-
anced budget may enhance the growth factor.
The analysis reveals that lowering unemployment by raising the capital in-
come tax rate might be a valuable policy option with the byproduct of poten-
tially even promoting growth. However, it remains to be shown how realistic
12it is that the policy change actually increases growth. To this end, the model
economy is calibrated to ﬁt the situation of the EU15 and to analyze the
growth eﬀects of increasing the capital income tax rate in diﬀerent scenarios.
Before computing the growth eﬀects of an increase of the capital income tax,
the parameters of the model have to be ﬁxed. Note that one period in the
model is assumed to last half a generation’s life, i.e. 30 years. Population
grows at the rate n ≈ 0.16, corresponding to an annual average growth rate
of roughly 0.5% over the last 30 years in the EU154. On the side of the
households, the parameter δ is set to δ = 1, implying that individuals do not
discount future consumption. Yet, in order to evaluate the eﬀect of a change
in the discount rate, we additionally consider the case δ =0 .55, thereby
matching an annual discount rate of 2%. With respect to the value of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, there exists no con-
sensus in the econometric literature. Consequently, most studies like Uhlig
and Yanagawa (1996) or Dalgaard and Jensen (2007) assume log-utilities,
i.e. σ =1 . 5 Since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion is crucial in determining the reaction of individual savings, alternative
scenarios with σ =5 /6a n dσ =1 0 /7 are also included in the analysis.6
To focus on the role of revenue-neutral changes of capital income taxation on
growth and in line with the formal model analysis, the wage tax is determined
endogenously to balance the budget. The exogenously given policy variables
pension level p and replacement rate b are set to p =0 .63 and b =0 .32. Both
values correspond to recent averages in the EU15 (OECD, 2007a,b). The
production function is calibrated following the standard literature (Layard
et al., 1991), entailing that the capital income share α is approximated by
α =0 .3. In order to match the average unemployment rate in the EU15 of
7.7% in 2006, the parameter φ is set to 2.25 and the bargaining power of
the union γ to 0.175, resulting in a mark-up over the alternative income of
µ =7 .5%.7 Following the literature and matching the data of the EU15, the
production eﬃciency index is set to A = 14.8 This generates annual growth
and after tax interest rates of 1.5% and 4.5%, respectively, for a capital
4See OECD (2008).
5Dalgaard and Jensen (2007) justify this observing that the empirical savings elasticity
is more or less constant. This implies that substitution and income eﬀects oﬀset each
other, which will only be the case if σ =1 .
6These choices correspond to the values used by Rivas (2003) who carries out a similar
calibration exercise.
7Since estimates of µ range from 5% − 15%, the parameter choice is in line with the
empirical literature, see e.g. Layard et al. (1991).
8We choose a slightly higher value than the one used by Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996)
in order to generate more plausible values for the growth and interest rate.
13income tax rate of 35%.9 The parameters of the model are summarized in
table 1.
Parameters
population growth rate n≈ 0.16
individual discount rate δ=1 [0.55]
elasticity of substitution σ=1 [0.83, 1.43]
capital income share α=0.3
index of labour market ﬂuctuations φ=2.25
union bargaining power γ=0.175
production eﬃciency index A=14
Table 1: Fixed parameters
In a next step, the eﬀects of an increase of the capital income tax on growth
are computed. Since there are no transitional dynamics, such a shock can
completely be described by the derivative of the growth factor with respect
to the capital income tax, dg/dtr.V a r y i n gtr, σ and δ, the entries in table 2
depict the change in the growth factor resulting from a marginal increase in
the capital tax rate, dg/dtr and taking into account that additional revenue
is used to reduce the wage tax. Since tw is endogenously determined, each
choice of the capital income tax tr implies a corresponding wage tax rate,
displayed in the second row. The range of capital income tax rates is chosen
to roughly match labour income tax rates in the EU15, ranging from 23% to
56%.
The calibration exercise reveals that there are cases with plausible parame-
ter constellations where an increase in the capital income tax fosters growth,
e.g. for capital income tax rates between 0.25 and 0.45 growth rises if the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution does not exceed σ = 1. Clearly, in case
of σ>1, positive growth eﬀects are less probable as the substitution eﬀect,
that negatively aﬀects savings, becomes more and more pronounced. More-
over, as the capital income tax increases, it is less likely that the proposed
policy reform promotes growth. Rather, the growth eﬀect of marginally rais-
ing the capital tax is decreasing in tr. Consequently, there seems to exist a
growth-maximizing capital income tax rate which, however, depends on the
parameter values chosen. For σ = 1, for example, this growth-maximizing
9This choice is in line with Rivas (2003). Moreover, the value roughly matches the
average eﬀective tax rate on capital income for the EU15 countries in the period of 1975-
2000 (Carey and Rabesona, 2002).
14σ =0 .83 σ =1 σ =1 .43
tr tw δ =1 δ =0 .55 δ =1 δ =0 .55 δ =1 δ =0 .55
0.25 0.51 0.64 0.40 0.62 0.33 0.55 0.07
0.3 0.49 0.58 0.36 0.52 0.27 0.36 -0.05
0.35 0.46 0.51 0.31 0.42 0.20 0.16 -0.17
0.4 0.44 0.43 0.25 0.31 0.12 -0.05 -0.31
0.45 0.42 0.34 0.19 0.19 0.04 -0.29 -0.44
0.5 0.40 0.24 0.12 0.05 -0.05 -0.55 -0.59
0.55 0.38 0.13 0.04 -0.10 -0.15 -0.83 -0.74
0.6 0.36 0.00 -0.05 -0.27 -0.26 -1.14 -0.90
Table 2: Growth eﬀects of marginally raising the capital income tax
capital income tax rate is well above 45%.
What are the policy conclusions to be drawn from this calibration exercise?
Of course, the model can not exactly mirror the situation in the EU15. Still
it points to an important insight that has so far been neglected in policy
discussions: The eﬀects of raising the capital income tax rate are not as
straightforward as often suggested. Especially when allowing for social secu-
rity systems and unemployment, additional eﬀects arise that might oﬀset the
(possibly negative) direct savings eﬀects. As has been shown, this might not
only inﬂuence growth positively, but moreover raise the level of employment
if revenues are used to lower taxes on wage income.
3.1 Extension: Growth in a small open economy
So far, a closed economy has been studied. Clearly, this puts major restric-
tions to the results derived as capital in a closed economy cannot escape
domestic taxation. To evaluate the growth eﬀects of the proposed policy
reform in an open economy setup, this section introduces imperfect capital
mobility, implying that capital can at least to some extent avoid excessive
tax rates by means of capital ﬂight.
15Allowing for capital mobility, two cases have to be distinguished: Firstly,
the domestic country might be more productive than the rest of the world,
entailing that the domestic rate of return r exceeds the world interest rate
r∗ and capital ﬂows into the country. Yet, the domestic economy could also
be less productive than the rest of the world, in which case capital would
be exported due to the higher world interest rate attainable abroad. To
distinguish both cases, an indicator variable η ∈{ 0,1} is introduced which
takes the value η = 1 if the domestic country is low-productive and exports
capital, and η = 0 if capital is imported.
Following Bräuninger (2002), it is further assumed that there exists a limit on
both capital in- and outﬂows. More precisely, imports and exports of capital
F are restricted to a ﬁxed proportion m with 0 <m<1 of domestic assets,
which are determined by previous savings S−1. The limit on capital imports
can be justiﬁed by the fact that foreign investors will typically not ﬁnance
the entire amount of assets requested, but rather limit their investments in
relation to assets held by the debtor country. Moreover, it seems to be plau-
sible to assume that residents are to some extent home-biased, implying that
they will at most invest a proportion m of their savings abroad irrespective
of a potentially remaining diﬀerence in the rates of return. This might e.g.
result from an informational advantage with respect to the domestic market,
implying that domestic bonds are perceived as more secure. Assuming a suf-
ﬁciently high diﬀerences in the rates of return between the domestic economy
and the rest of the world, these limits will always be binding. Consequently,
both cases can be summarized by
F =( 1− 2η)mS−1. (20)
If η = 1, it follows that F = −mS−1, indicating that part of domestic assets
are invested abroad. If η =0 ,t h e nF = mS−1 denotes capital that is being
imported.
The government can impose diﬀerent taxes on the various forms of capital
income that might arise. The tax τi is levied on returns to capital inﬂows
(inbound investments), i.e. investment of non-residents in the domestic econ-
omy. τo denotes the tax rate on capital outﬂow (outbound investments), i.e.
investment of residents abroad. In analogy to the closed economy, tr is the
tax on interest income of residents in the domestic economy. Introducing
the diﬀerent tax rates on capital income allows to distinguish between the
residence and source principle of international taxation: Under the residence
principle, resident’s capital income from various sources is taxed at a single
rate, tr = τo, and non-resident’s capital income is tax-exempt, τi =0 . I n
16contrast, only domestic source capital income is taxed if the source principle
is realized, that is tr = τi and τo =0 .
Allowing for capital mobility, there may be additional tax revenue in com-
parison to the closed economy, depending on the principle of taxation used
and on whether capital is exported or imported. While public expenditures
remain unchanged, the revenue side of the public budget becomes
t
ww(1 − u)N + t
rr(1 − ηm)S−1 + τ
ir(1 − η)mS−1 + τ
or
∗ηmS−1. (21)
Once again, one can rearrange the constraint to express the wage tax as a
function of capital income taxation,
t
w =
p + bu(1 + n)





where τ =( 1−ηm)trr+(1−η)mτir+ηmτor∗ comprises the tax per unit of
capital invested. If capital is exported (η = 1), this per unit tax reduces to
τ =( 1− m)trr + mτor∗, indicating that returns to capital invested at home
are taxed at the rate tr, while capital returns earned abroad are subject to
the tax rate on outbound investments, τo. If capital is imported (η = 0), the
per unit tax on capital comprises taxes on resident’s capital investments S−1
and taxes on inbound investments mS−1, τ = trr+mτir. In either case, and
in line with the closed economy setup, increases in capital income taxation
permit a reduction of the labour income tax.
On the household side, allowing for capital mobility introduces the possibility
to invest abroad and possibly earn a higher rate of return. Since diﬀerent
tax rates might apply to investments at home and abroad, capital income of
residents can be summarized as
[1+( 1− t
r)r](1 − ηm)s + [1+( 1− τ
o)r
∗]ηms. (23)
For η = 0, the economy is high productive and all savings will be invested
at home, implying that the rate of return coincides with the one derived in
the closed economy setup, 1 + (1 − tr)r.I fη = 1, however, a fraction m of
individual savings is invested abroad and the interest factor now comprises
rates of return to diﬀerent sources of capital income. Introducing the interest
factor   R =1+[(1 − tr)r(1 − ηm)+( 1− τo)r∗ηm] allows to rewrite capital
income in a way that matches the formulas of the closed economy case,
namely as   Rs. Although households can avoid excessive taxation to some
extend by shifting a part of their investments abroad, the discount rate is
negatively aﬀected by both increases in the tax rate of domestic as well as
outbound investments.
17While households are possibly confronted with a diﬀerent rate of return to
their investments, individual decision making itself is unaﬀected by capital
mobility. Consequently, maximizing utility yields a same savings function as
before,
s(   R,σ)=ϑ(   R,σ)I − θ(   R,σ)pw+1. (24)
It is important to point out, however, that the functional forms of ϑ(·)a n d
θ(·) remain the same, entailing that savings react to changes in the discount
rate in the same manner as they do in the closed economy model.
Clearly, in the presence of mobile capital, the capital stock no longer cor-
responds to previous savings. Rather, to determine the amount of capital
employed in the domestic economy in a given period one needs to adjust
domestic assets by the amount of in- or outbound investments F,
K+1 = S + F+1 = (1+( 1− 2η)m)S. (25)









Obviously, the growth factor of capital is higher if capital ﬂows into the
country in which case the growth rate becomes g =( 1+m)S/K while capital
outﬂow reduces growth by the factor 1 − m. Taking into account that the
interest factor and the wage tax are aﬀected by changes in the tax system,
the growth factor resembles the one derived for a closed economy setup,
g =












As equation (27) suggests, the qualitative eﬀects of raising the capital income
tax rates remain unchanged since both the interest factor and the wage tax
respond in the same way. Yet, the overall eﬀect additionally depends on the
regime of international taxation.
Under residence-based taxation of capital income , tr = τo and τi =0 ,d o -
mestic investors are hit by the tax increase no matter where they invest their
assets while foreign investors are tax exempt in the local economy. Hence,
changes in the capital income tax do not inﬂuence the relation between the
domestic and the world rate of return, and an increase in the capital in-
come tax will not alter the status of the domestic country as low- or high-
productive. Yet, under source-based taxation of capital income, tr = τi and
18τo = 0, the relation between the domestic and the world rate of return to
capital is aﬀected by changes in the capital income tax. To see this, consider
again a foreign investor who intends to invest in a high-productivity country.
A rise in the source-based tax on capital investments might render such an
investment ineﬃcient as profound increase in the taxation of domestic capi-
tal returns could turn a high- into a low-productivity country. Such a policy
would clearly result in capital outﬂows combined with a sharp decline of the
growth factor. Yet, given the predominance of the residence principle in the
EU15 with respect to the returns on savings, this problem of source-based
income taxation seems to be of minor practical importance. Rather, the
analysis reveals that allowing for mobile capital does not change the results:
raising the capital income tax to ﬁnance a reduction of wage taxation can
not only increase employment but also promote economic growth. The pro-
ceeding part of the paper will, thus, return to analyzing the closed economy
model.
4 Welfare Eﬀects
So far, the analysis has focused on the growth eﬀects of increasing capital
taxation. However, it remains unclear in which way the reform aﬀects the
welfare of the diﬀerent generations and if potential losers can be compen-
sated by the winners of the tax change. Yet, this is of special importance in
determining the political support for such a reform. To address this issue,
the following section sheds light on the question whether a reform capable of
generating positive growth eﬀect additionally leads to a net welfare gain for
the economy. To this end, the welfare eﬀects of a tax reform today are ﬁrstly
evaluated for the currently young and all successive generations, given that
growth is indeed positively aﬀected. In a second step, the welfare eﬀects for
the currently old population are derived and the potential for compensation
is determined in a calibration exercise.
Consider ﬁrst the welfare eﬀects of the currently young and all subsequent
generations. As the tax change is assumed to be announced prior to private
decision making, these individuals can fully adjust to the new tax rates. To
determine the welfare eﬀects of these adjustments, one needs to derive the
individual’s indirect utility function Γ(R,I,w+1). Recall that income I refers
to the net wage in case of employment and to unemployment beneﬁts in case
of job loss. Noting that wages grow at the rate g/(1 + n) simpliﬁes the
















which describes the individual’s maximum utility given the price for future
consumption R and the present value of life-time income, I +
pwg
(1+n)R.T h e





































> 0. Clearly, changes in the capital income tax rate
aﬀect welfare via three diﬀerent channels. Firstly, increasing the capital in-
come tax directly reduces the private return to savings,
∂R
∂tr < 0 and, thereby,
aﬀects the present value of an individual’s life-time income in an ambiguous
way: On the one hand, it induces an income eﬀect that decreases future con-
sumption possibilities, but on the other hand it increases the present value of
future pensions. Secondly, raising the capital tax allows for a reduction of the
wage tax, ∂tw
∂tr < 0, which increases the net income of employed individuals
and, thus, their present and future consumption. Consequently, the positive
eﬀects of the tax reform are higher for employed individuals than they are for
the unemployed and can at least partially oﬀset the possibly negative eﬀects
resulting from changes in the private return to savings. Thirdly, the growth
eﬀects of the tax reform directly inﬂuence future wages and, therefore, the
pension income of individuals. As has been discussed before, these growth
eﬀects are in general ambiguous,
dg
dtr  0. Yet, if positive growth eﬀects
are present, these will contribute to the welfare of the currently young and
all successive generations and, thereby, render a net welfare gain even more
probable.
The welfare eﬀects for the currently old population are more clear-cut as these
individuals can no longer adjust to changes in tax rates. Rather, decisions
on the amount of savings of this generation, s−1, have been made prior to
the tax reform and, together with pension, determine their level of old-age
consumption, c2,−1 = Rs−1 + pw. While the level of pension in the period
of reform remains unchanged, an increased capital income tax reduces the










20with c1,−1 and c2,−1 denoting current and old-age consumption of the gen-
eration born in period −1. As equation (30) reveals, the old generation
experiences a welfare loss. This gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Increasing the capital income tax while maintaining a bal-
anced budget may enhance individual welfare for the current and all subse-
quent generations, while the presently old generation experiences a welfare
loss.
As the welfare eﬀects for the young generation are ambiguous while the old
generation loses, it remains unclear whether the reform can generate a net
welfare gain. Thus, political support might be lacking even in case of posi-
tive growth eﬀects. To clarify whether this is indeed the case, the following
calibration computes the marginal welfare eﬀects of the tax reform, given
that growth is positively eﬀected, dg/dtr > 0. More precisely, the calibration
young old net eﬀect
tr tw δ =1 δ =0 .55 δ =1 δ =0 .55 δ =1 δ =0 .55
0.25 0.51 1.81 1.75 -0.44 -0.24 1.67 1.79
0.3 0.49 1.73 1.67 -0.45 -0.25 1.57 1.70
0.35 0.46 1.65 1.60 -0.46 -0.25 1.46 1.60
0.4 0.44 1.56 1.52 -0.47 -0.26 1.34 1.50
0.45 0.42 1.46 1.43 -0.48 -0.27 1.21 1.40
Table 3: Welfare eﬀects of marginally raising the capital income tax for
currently and formerly employed individuals
builds on the previous calibration exercise and determines the welfare eﬀects
for the range of capital income tax rates for which a positive growth eﬀect
has been derived. For clarity of presentation, the results displayed refer to
the case σ =1 . 10 The parameter choices as depicted in table 1 remain un-
changed. Moreover, the capital stock in the period of tax reform has been
normalized to one. The entries in tables 3 and 4 depict changes in the level
of welfare for the young and old generation, respectively, which result from a
10The ﬁndings are equally well supported by the calibration results for σ =5 /6a n d
σ =1 0 /7, which can be obtained from the authors upon request.
21young old net eﬀect
tr tw δ =1 δ =0 .55 δ =1 δ =0 .55 δ =1 δ =0 .55
0.25 0.51 1.97 1.79 -0.24 -0.12 2.05 1.96
0.3 0.49 1.99 1.80 -0.22 -0.10 2.09 1.99
0.35 0.46 2.00 1.81 -0.19 -0.08 2.12 2.01
0.4 0.44 1.99 1.80 -0.16 -0.06 2.15 2.03
0.45 0.42 1.97 1.78 -0.13 -0.04 2.16 2.03
Table 4: Welfare eﬀects of marginally raising the capital income tax for
currently and formerly unemployed individuals
marginal increase in the capital income tax rate. For clarity of presentation
we distinguish between individuals with and without an employment history.
The net welfare eﬀect is derived comparing the marginal welfare eﬀect of the
currently young generation with the loss of the old generation, taking into
account that the population grows at rate n and unemployment declines as
ar e s p o n s et ol o w e rl a b o u ri n c o m et a x a tion. This net eﬀect determines the
scope for compensation between winners and losers in the period of reform.
As the calibration reveals, positive welfare eﬀects arise as long as capital
income taxation promotes growth: Although the old generation experiences
a decline in consumption, the gains for the young are high enough to com-
pensate them, e.g. by means of an intergenerational transfer in the period of
reform.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the growth eﬀects of a revenue neutral tax reform that
increases the tax rate on capital income to reduce wage-related social security
contributions. We ﬁnd that such a policy not only reduces unemployment
but can additionally promote economic growth. The overall eﬀect on growth,
however, depends on diﬀerent, partly opposing eﬀects on capital accumula-
tion. Firstly, the lower wage tax directly raises the net income of households,
thereby fostering savings and, consequently, growth. Secondly, the present
value of pensions increases, inducing a disincentive to accumulate capital
22and, thus, leading to lower growth. Thirdly, there are the opposing income
and substitution eﬀects, having an ambiguous impact on growth. Depending
on the magnitude of the various eﬀects, a policy reform that increases the
capital income tax in a revenue-neutral way has the scope to not only reduce
unemployment but moreover facilitate the growth process.
Calibrating the model to match data from the EU15 suggests that the afore-
mentioned tax reform can indeed be growth-enhancing if the initial capital
income tax is not too high. This is due to the fact that there seems to exist a
growth-maximizing level of the capital income tax below which any increase
of the tax on capital income contributes to the growth process. In an ex-
tension to the basic model setup, imperfect mobility of capital is allowed for
to capture the fact that taxes on capital income might cause capital ﬂight
and thereby severely aﬀect the growth process. Yet, it is shown that as long
as the residence principle prevails the qualitative results do not hinge on
the closed economy setup. Even in case of imperfect capital mobility, an
increase of the capital income tax not only promotes employment but may
additionally foster growth. Moreover, it is shown that political support for
the aforementioned reform is probable as long as growth-promoting eﬀects
are present: since the gains of the young generation outweigh the losses for
the old, the reform generates a net welfare gain for the entire population.
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